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I. STATI~MENT OFTHE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
piaintiffhespondent, Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a I-'(",'rrl(>, Medical Centers, LLC 
(PMC), filed a Verified Complaint alleging breach of a Ground Lease Agreement against two 
defendants: Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC (Quail Ridge) and Century Park Associates, 
LLC (Century Park), PMC subsequently sought, and received, leave to amend its Complaint and 
added a claim for declaratory relief. The defendants tiled an Answer and Jury Demand. The 
case was tried to the Court on May 14-15,2012, in Bannock County District Court. The Court 
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on October 17,2012, and entered an 
Amended Declaratory Judgment on November 26,2012, This appeal followed. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
PMC filed a Verified Complaint against Quail Ridge and Century Park on February 28, 
2010. (R Vol. I, pp. 1-51.) The Verified Complaint alleged that Quail Ridge and Century Park 
were successors-in-interest to a certain Ground Lease Agreement that had been entered into by 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc. (IHC) and Sterling Development Co. (Sterling) in 1983. (ld.) 
The Ground Lease Agreement pertained to real property located within the City of Pocatello. 
(ld.) The Verified Complaint alleged that both Quail Ridge and Century Park had breached the 
Ground Lease Agreement and had failed to pay an adjusted amount of rent. (ld., pp.I-51.) Quail 
Ridge and Century Park filed an Answer and Jury Demand on August 2,2010. (ld., pp. 54-57.) 
All parties filed dispositive motions. The district court heard argument on the motions on 
August 5, 2011. (ld., p. 60.) The district court took the motions under advisement. (ld.) The 
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court on 
p. 
PMC leave to amend complaint. PMC an Amended 
Complaint on May 4, 201 (hi., pp. 96-104.) Quail Ridge and Century Park answered the 
Amended Complaint on May 201 a week before triaL (ld, pp. 105-09.) 
The case was tried without ajury on May 14-15,2012. (ld., pp. 128-29.) During trial, 
Quail Ridge and Century Park moved tor directed verdict on Count I of the Amended Complaint. 
(ld., p. 129.) Count I alleged breach of contract against the defendants. (ld. pp. 96-104.) PMC 
stipulated to dismiss its breach of contract claim and the district court granted the defendants' 
motion. (ld., p. 129.) Century Park moved for a dismissal of the remaining declaratory relief 
claim and PMC also stipulated to the motion. (ld.) 
The parties submitted post-trial briefing to the district court. (ld., pp. 135-63.) The 
district court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on October 17, 2012. (ld., pp. 
166-203.) The district court found that PMC was not entitled to adjusted rent for 2007-09 but 
also found an entitlement to adjusted rent for 2010-12. (ld., p. 201.) The district court entered a 
Declaratory Judgment on November 13,2012, and an Amended Declaratory Judgment on 
November 26,2012. (R Vol. II, pp. 214-18.) Quail Ridge timely appealed. (ld., pp. 219-226.) 
C. Statement of Facts. 
PMC is a Delaware LLC licensed and authorized to do business within the state of Idaho. 
(R Vol. I, pp. 96-104.) Quail Ridge, the sole defendant/appellant, is a Tennessee LLC licensed 
and authorized to do business within the state ofIdaho. (Id., pp. 105-09.) 
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May 15, The living center is located on 
acres in Pocatello, Idaho. (ld., 139:14-18.) Quail Ridge owns the (ld) PMC owns the 
4.25 acres ofrenl property. (ld., 139:21-140:1; Trial Tr. Vol. I, 36:1-3, May 14,2012.) 
In January 1983, IHe and Sterling entered in a Ground Lease Agreement (Ground Lease) 
pertaining to the 4.25 acres of property involved in this case. (Trial Tr. Vol. II, 140:2-22; PL Ex. 
101.) The Ground Lease governs, in part, the current parties' relationship. There is no dispute 
whether PMC is the successor-in-interest to the lessor's (IHC) interest in the Ground Lease. 
Quail Ridge similarly aCkJlOWledges that it is the successor-in-interest to the lessee's (Sterling) 
interest. Section 1.3( a) of the Ground Lease establishes the initial value for determining rent. 
The section provides: 
An initial annual rental shall be calculated on the basis of fifteen percent (15%) of the 
value of the leased land. For purposes of the first three (3) years from the 
Commencement Date of this Lease, the leased land shall be valued at the rate of Fifteen 
Thousand and Noll 00 Dollars ($15,000.00) per acre. 
(Pl. Ex. 101.) Section 1.3(b) discusses adjustment ofthe rent value and provides, in part: 
The annual net rental as set forth above shall be adjusted every three (3) years beginning 
on the Commencement Date of this Lease, referred to below as the rent adjustment date .. 
. . The rent as adjusted shall be equal to fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of 
the leased land, exclusive of the improvements on the premises. Detennination of fair 
market value shall be based on the highest and best use ofthe land on the applicable rent 
adjustment date without taking the leasehold into account. The determination shall take 
into account the parties' agreement that the initial minimum rent is the above-stated 
percentage applies to a fair market value of Fifteen Thousand and Noll 00 Dollars 
($15, 000. 00) per acre and shall also take into account any determinations of market 
value made under this lease for the purpose of adjustments for periods preceding the 
applicable rent adjustment date. (emphasis added) 
(ld.) The last paragraph of Section 1.3(b) states: 
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(ld.) Under the Ground Lease, Quail Ridge paid PMC rent in the amount of$9,562.50 per 
annum. (Trial Tr. VoL Il, 141 :14-15, DeL Exs. 256, 257.) No one ever adjusted the rent amount 
during the intervening years and once Quail Ridge became subject to the Ground Lease it paid 
the rent every year in the amount of$9,562.50. (Trial Tr. Vol. II, 144:17-24; 150:5-15,20-24.) 
Earl Christison, former Pocatello Regional Medical Center (PRMC) I CEO/administrator 
from 1989-2000, reviewed all PRMC contracts including the Ground Lease during his tenure. (R 
VoL II, pp. 308-10.) Christison testified during his deposition that PRMC would have gone 
through each contract and "either renegotiated them or re-evaluated how they existed" on a local 
and corporate level. (Id.) Christison testified that the hospital would have tried to "squeeze 
every nickel and dime out of what [the hospital] could have got from them at the time[.]" (Id.) 
The land values from 1989-2000 would not have supported an adjusted rent and so PRMC did 
not adjust the rent. (Id., pp. 308-10.) Don Wadle, vice-president of clinical support for PMC, 
confirmed that rent had not been adjusted since 2002 when PMC took over the IHC facility. 
(Trial Tr. VoL 1,38:14-39:10.) 
In 1996, an entity named Pocatello Medical Investors Limited Partnership (PMI) began 
operating the facility known as Quail Ridge. (Trial Tr. VoL II, 145 :9-18.) PMI subleased the 
building from Sterling, the original tenant. (Id., 145:9-18.) PtvlI transitioned the facility from a 
I PRMC was the name of the mc facility in Pocatello. 





a Landlord Consent and Estoppel 
Certificate) certifying to PMl that the rent was 
$9,562.50 per annum and that the rent would be adjusted at the next adjustment period. (De[ 
Ex. 211, '15.) Counsel represented IHC during the 1996 transaction. (Trial Tr. Vol. II, 152:2-11.) 
Neither PM! nor Quail Ridge's records evidence a request by the landlord to adjust the rent. (lei., 
150:25-151 .) PMI continued to sublease from Sterling from 1996-2001. (ld, 153:3-7.) 
In 2001, the parties substantially restructured their relationship. (ld., 153 :8-11.) Sterling 
sought to the building. Forrest Preston, PMI and Quail Ridge's owner, wanted to buy the 
building. (Jd., 153:12-21.) Sterling's principals wanted to be released from their guarantees of 
the Ground Lease and also wanted Sterling released from the financing on the building. (ld.) 
Sterling owed approximately $2.8 million on the building. (ld., 154: 1-4.) 
The 2001 restructure resulted in Quail Ridge stepping into Sterling's shoes vis-a.-vis the 
Ground Lease. (Jd., 154:18-155:4.) The parties amended and restated the old sublease with 
Quail Ridge becoming the sublessor and PMI remaining as subtenant. (Jd., 155:9-16.) 
IRC retained Guy Kroesche, an attorney with Stoel Rives in Salt Lake City, Utah, to 
represent it during the restructuring of the parties' arrangement. (!d., 156:9-11.) 
Kroesche negotiated terms of the 2001 restructure with Richard Faulkner, in-house 
counsel for PMIIQuail Ridge. Kroesche made changes to the documents ofthe restructure and 
many of his changes were "crafted towards rewriting the existing agreements." (R Vol. II, p. 
291.) Kroesche received all ofthe documents involved in the restructure and commented on 
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anew 
Landlord 
Certificate ). 164:13-23; Kroesche 
Consent and Estoppel Certificate to add provisions that required a guarantee of the payments 
under the Ground Lease. (,,>'ee id.) This addition constituted a new term to the parties' 
arrangement. (Trial Tr. VoL II, 164:22-23.) Forrest Preston's personal guarantee also constituted 
another new tenn for the 2001 restructuring, in addition to other changes and amendments in the 
deaL (ld., 165:19-21.) 
The 2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate is different than 1996 
counterpart. The 2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Celiificate never makes reference to the 
ability to adjust rent at the next adjustment date under the Ground Lease. (Def. Ex. 228, '1 5.) 
Instead, the language about rent being adjusted at the next adjustment date is conspicuously 
absent in the 2001 iteration. Faulkner, who acted as Quail Ridge's corporate representative 
during trial, testified about why the 2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate differed 
from its 1996 counterpart. Faulkner said: 
Because I had looked at what the parties had been doing since 1996, and for the five 
years that our group had been involved in the facility the rent adjustment mechanism had 
never been raised. And then I spoke with the folks from Sterling Development Group and 
understood that in the entire 13 years preceding our involvement no one had ever raised 
the section of the rent adjustment in order to increase or change the rent. So I wanted to 
confinn in the course of dealing that it had been waived. 
(Trial Tr. VoL II, 166:7-17.) Per Faulkner's testimony, in 2001, Quail Ridge "wanted to put to 
bed once and for all what the rent was going to be. So in Mr. Preston agreeing to personally 
guarantee the lease, he wanted to know what the rent was. This served to confirm what the 
Appellant Brief 10 
course nor 
II to 1 Landlord Consent and Estoppel 
in 5. (ld., 1 
After 2001, Quail Ridge paid off several million dollars in debt associated with the loan 
related to the Quail Ridge facility. (ld., 171 :20-172:4.) Quail Ridge made the decision to payoff 
debt because it relied on knowing that the Ground Lease rent had been set at a fixed amount and 
was no longer subject to the rent adjustment provision of the Ground Lease. (Id., 172: 11-20.) 
Quail Ridge also decided to invest more than $1 million in building renovations due to its 
understanding that the rent had been fixed at a set amount. (ld., 174:2-7.) Faulkner testified, 
no one had invoked paragraph 1.3(b) of the Ground Lease at any time during its existence. (Id., 
178:8-19.) One of the critical roles the 2001 restructure played was to "nail down what the rent 
under the ground lease was going to be going forward." (Id., 182:14-19.) 
In 2002, PMC became the successor in interest to IHC's interests in the Ground Lease. 
(Trial Tr. Vol. I, 39:6-9.) It did not immediately seek to adjust the rent. (Id.,36:7-37:20.) In 
2008, PMC began researching the Ground Lease and claimed that it had made a mistake in 
managing the Ground Lease and that it had failed to adjust the rent as set forth in paragraph 
1.3(b). (Id.) The lawsuit is the first time that any party sought to adjust the rent. 
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ISSUES PRESENTEIl ON APPEAL 
A. Whether the district court erred hy not finding modification. 
B. Whether the district court erred hy failing to find waiver. 
C. Whether the district court erred by not applying estoppel to bar PMC's claim. 
D. Whether the district court erred by disregarding the Ground Lease' language. 
E. Whether the district court erred by not finding a course of dealing. 
F. Whether the district court erred in admitting the testimony of Brad Janoush. 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review 
When reviewing a district court's decision after a trial without ajury, the Court's review 
of the decision: 
[I]s limited to ascertaining whether the evidence supports the findings of fact, and 
whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law. A district court's findings of 
fact in a bench trial will be liberally construed on appeal in favor of the judgment entered, 
in view of the district court's role as trier of fact. It is the province of the district judge 
acting as trier of fact to weigh conflicting evidence and testimony and to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses. We will not substitute our view of the facts for the view of 
the district court. Instead, where findings of fact are based on substantial evidence, even 
if the evidence is conflicting, those findings will not be overturned on appeal. We 
exercise free review over the lower court's conclusions of law, however, to determine 
whether the court correctly stated the applicable law, and whether the legal conclusions 
are sustained by the facts found. Fox v. Mountain W Elec., Inc., 137 Idaho 703, 706-07, 
52 P.3d 848, 851-52 (2002) (quoting Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist. v. Wash. Fed. Sav., 
135 Idaho 518, 521, 20 P.3d 702, 705 (2001)). 
Clayson v. Zebe, 280 P.3d 731, 735 (Idaho 2012). Substantial evidence is that which a 
reasonable trier of fact would accept and rely upon it in determining findings of fact. Duspiva v. 
Fillmore, 293 P.3d 651,655 (Idaho 2013). 
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B. The district court erred by not finding a modification. 
court ciTed it mled had not 
Ground Lease in 2001. Quail Ridge this a pretrial motion in 
1.3(b) of 
which the 
district court denied on May 4, 2012. (R Vol. I, pp. 123-25; Hr'g Tr. 15:20-19:22, May, 4, 
2012.) Quail Ridge also argued post-trial that the 2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel 
Certificate modified the Ground Lease, constituted a waiver, and barred PMC from adjusting the 
rent. (R Vol. I, pp. 153-63.) The district court misapplied the law governing estoppel 
certificates and reached an incorrect result. The Court should reverse the district court's findings 
and mle that the parties modified the terms of l.3(b). 
Contracts may be modified by mutual consent of the parties. Watkins Co., LLC v. 
Storms, 272 P.3d 503,508 (Idaho 2012) (citing Ore-Ida Potato Prods'., Inc. v. Larsen, 83 Idaho 
290,293,362 P.2d 384,385 (1961)). The fact of agreement may be implied from a course of 
conduct in accordance with its existence and assent may be implied from the acts of one party in 
accordance with the tenns of a change proposed by the other. Watkins Co., LLC v. Storms, 272 
P.3d at 508. Consent to a modification may be implied from a course of conduct consistent with 
the asserted modification. Res. Eng'g. Inc. v. Siler, 94 Idaho 935, 938, 500 P.2d 836, 839 
(1972). Where an agreement involves repeated occasions for performance by either party with 
knowledge of the nature of the performance and the opportunity to object to it by the other, any 
course of performance accepted or acquiesced in without objection is given great weight in the 
interpretation of the agreement. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 202(4). 
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a 
is a common device used in real estate transactions. It 
ora' statement by a party as a tenant or mortgagee) certifying for another's 
benefit that certain tllcts arc correct, as that a Lease exists, that there are no defaults, and that rent 
is paid to a certain date. '" Lakevie"w Mgmf., Inc. v. Care Realty, LLC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
28171, *54 (March 30,2009). "A party's delivery of this statement estops that party from later 
claiming a different set of facts." Id.; see also K's Merch. lvlart, Inc. v. Northgate Ltd. P'ship, 
835 N.E.2d 965, 971 (Ill. 2005). "A party who executes an estoppel certificate should not be 
allowed to claims of which it knew or should have known at the time the certificate was 
executed." K's Men'h. Mart, Inc., 835 N.E.2d at 972. "An estoppel celiificate binds the 
signatory to the statements made and estops that party from claiming to the contrary at a later 
time." Plaza FreevklY Ltd. P 'ship v. First Mountain Bank, 81 Cal. App. 4th 616,626,96 Cal. 
Rptr.2d 865, 872 (2000). In Plaza Freeway Limited Partnership, the Court found that "the 
estoppel celiificate served to set forth the key terms of the lease agreement, as understood by the 
tenant at the time of the plaintiff's purchase of the property." Id. at 628,96 Cal.Rptr.2d at 873. 
No party disputes that the Ground Lease originally provided a mechanism for adjusting 
rent. (PI. Ex. 101.) Also, no one is arguing that rent was adjusted at any time from 1983-2009. 
(R Vol. I, p. 179.) The lawsuit is the first attempt to adjust the rent in approximately twenty-
seven years. Two transactions, in 1996 and 2001, demonstrate that a modification occurred and 
that the ability to adjust rent was removed from the parties' arrangement by mutual assent. The 
district court failed to accurately apply the law to the facts and erred as a consequence. 
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a as Quail 
. Vol. II, 1 :9-1 12.) PMI 
to that (ld. 147:4-5.) One doeuments as a pmi 
of the 1996 transaction was a Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate signed by Everett 
Goodwin, Chief Financial Officer for IHC. (Def. Ex. 211.) Paragraph 5 of the 1996 Landlord 
Consent and Estoppel Certificate states: 
Under the Lease, the Tenant is obligated to pay rent currently at the rate of NINE 
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED SIXTY TWO DOLLARS AND 50/XX CENTS 
($9,562.50) per annum. Rent has been paid through and inciuding February 28, 1996. 
Under Section 1.3(b) of the Lease, the rent shall be adjusted on the next rent adjustment 
date, March 1, 1998. 
(ld.) Paragraph 5 of the 1996 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate contains two items that 
are of note: (1) it clearly states the annual rent to be paid under the Ground Lease, affirming that 
the rent had not been adjusted in the years since 1983 and (2) it provides that rent shall be 
adjusted in March 1998. (ld.) Because the rent remained static in 1996, the parties agreed that 
the fair market value was $15,OOO.OO/acre. According to the language of paragraph 1.3(b), this 
agreement should have been taken into account when deciding subsequent rent adjustments. (Pl. 
Ex. 101.) The district court did not take the transaction into account in its findings. 
Additionally, the 2001 transaction contains different terms than the 1996 transaction 
because it constitued a significant restructuring of the parties and the agreements. (Trial Tr. Vol. 
I, 153:8-11.) Sterling sold the building to Forrest Preston. (ld., 153:12-21.) Quail Ridge 
assumed the Ground Lease. (ld., 155:9-16.) The parties amended the sublease between Sterling 
and PMI. Quail Ridge could become the sublessor with PMI remaining as the sublessee. (ld., 
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6.) f out anew 
a vital to the transaction. IHC continued to 
own the real property where the Quail Ridge building is located. Attorney Guy Kroesche 
represented IHC during the 2001 transaction. (ld., 156:9-11.) Kroesche received copies of every 
document associated with the 2001 transaction. (R Vol. II, p. 291.) Kroesche and Faulkner 
negotiated over the substance of the transactional documents, including the 2001 Landlord 
Consent and Estoppel Certificate. (ld.) 
Many of the changes suggested by Kroesche were "crafted towards rewriting the existing 
agreements." (R Vol. II, p. 291.) As counsel tor IHC, Kroesche received all of the restructure 
documents and commented on many of them. (Trial Tr. VoL II, 164:8-17; Oef. Ex. 228). 
Importantly, Kroesche edited the 2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate and added, for 
instance, terms that required a payment guarantee of the Ground Lease. (See id., 164:13-23; Oef. 
Ex. 228.) There is no dispute whether Kroesche recommended changes to the estoppel 
certificate and that many of his suggestions were incorporated into the final version. Kroesche's 
involvement in the 2001 restructure demonstrates that the terms of the 2001 Landlord Consent 
and Estoppel Certificate were negotiated at arms-length. 
New terms were added to the parties' relationship in 2001. For instance, Forrest Preston 
was to sign a personal guarantee as a part of the 2001 transaction. (Trial Tr. Vol. II, 164:22-23.) 
The personal guarantee constituted a new, additional term for the 2001 transaction. (ld., 165: 19-
21.) The parties made other changes. Thus, the 2001 transaction created a new arrangement 
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nn0r.,~~ and I~Sl:ODDel is substantively than 
1996 200 I version, paragraph 5 omits the statement that rent would be 
adjusted on the next rent adjustment date. (Def. Ex. 228, ~ 5.) Faulkner, Quail Ridge's corporate 
representative during trial, cxplained the change during his testimony at trial. He testified: 
Because I had looked at what the parties had been doing since 1996, and for the five 
years that our group had been involved in the facility the rent adjustment mechanism had 
never been raised. And then I spoke with the folks from Sterling Development Group and 
understood that in the entire 13 years preceding our involvement no one had ever raised 
the section oCthe rent adjustment in order to increase or change the rent. So I wanted to 
confirm in the course of dealing that it had been waived. 
(Trial Tr. Vol. II, 166:7-17.) Faulkner testified that Quail Ridge: 
[Wlanted to put to bed once and for all what the rent was going to be. So in Mr. Preston 
agreeing to personally guarantee the lease, he wanted to know what the rent was. This 
served to confirm what the course of dealing had been for all that many years before this. 
(Id., 170:8-16.) IHC never objected to the substantive change in paragraph 5. (Id., 170:21-24.) 
Kroesche reviewed the substance of the 2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate and 
Everett Goodwin signed the document on IHC's behalf. (Def. Ex. 228.) 
The 2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate modifies paragraph 1.3(b) of the 
Ground Lease. The 2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate evidences mutual assent or 
acquiescence to the elimination of the rent adjustment provision found in 1.3(b). The distriet 
court's finding that "the only evidenee in the record regarding the modification of the Lease 
Agreement is the subjective intent of Faulkner" stands in stark relief next to the substance of the 
2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate which is an express, written modification of the 
pmiies' lease arrangement and the fact that additional terms were added to the parties' 
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I, p. 
demostratcs that modification of by 
additional consideration. The district court's finding ignores the totality of 
evidence, which leads to only one reasonable conclusion: that the parties' expressly fixed the rent 
amount at the historical per annum amount and, in consideration thereot~ the CEO of Quail 
Ridge personally guaranteed the lease payments for the duration of the lease. 
Idaho law allows course of conduct or written agreements to constitute a modification of 
a preexisting contract. Watkins Co., LLe, 272 P.3d at 508. The 2001 Landlord Consent and 
Estoppel Certificate evidences mutual assent to a new written agreement The certificate 
contains terms that are substantively different from the Ground Lease. The document plainly 
provides for fixed rent starting in 2001. (Def Ex. 228.) All of the parties signed the 2001 
Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate. The district court, therefore, erred when it concluded 
that the only evidence supporting modification was Faulkner's subjective intent because the 
document itself was evidence of the modification. 
Quail Ridge recognizes that the following language also appears in the 2001 Landlord 
Consent and Estoppel Certificate: 
Landlord's consent to the assignment and assumption and/or to the sublease as set forth 
herein shall not constitute or be construed as (a) an acknowledgement or consent to any 
other assignment, assumption and/or sublease, (b) a waiver or modification by Landlord 
of the Tenant's duties or obligations under the Lease, or excuse Tenant's performance of 
any terms or condition of the Lease, and/or (c) a waiver or modification by Landlord of 
any of its rights under the Lease, including without limitation Landlord's rights pursuant 
to Section 12.1 of the Lease. 
(Def. Ex. 228.) This language is not dispositive of the modification issue. Instead of finding this 






P.3d at 508. During 
lHC acted in a manner consistent with 
modification. It never sought to adjust rent. PMC, when it assumed IHC's position in 2002, 
never sought to adjust the rent until 2009. The district court failed to analyze the subsequent 
conduct of the parties in light of the 2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate's terms. 
Faulkner testified that the change to paragraph 5 was intended to accomplish a 
modification of the original Ground Lease. (Trial Tr. Vol. II, 166:7-1 170:8-16.) PMC failed 
to refute Faulkner's testimony. Had PMC done so, the district court would have cited and relied 
on that testimony. It did not. (R Vol. I, p. 197, ~ 35.) Faulkner's intent to modify the 2001 
Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certiticate is not the type of "subjective intent" discussed in 
Beus v. Beus, 254 P.3d 1231 (Idaho 2011), the case relied upon by the district court. This case is 
distinct because the document fully disclosed the intent to Kroesche and IHe. Faulkner left out 
the adjustment language from paragraph 5, submitted it to K.roesche for additional changes and 
received none. The parties ultimately agreed to the terms as set forth in Defendant's Exhibit 228 
and negotiated at arms-length. 
The district court improperly criticized and dismissed Faulkner's testimony in paragraph 
35 of its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The district court wrote that "removing 
language that was present in an earlier document and not discussing the same or making the 
other party aware of its deletion does not establish 'mutual assent.'" (R Vol. I, p. 197.) 
However, the district court cites no evidence for its conclusion that Quail Ridge had somehow 
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II court never to 
a conclusion. court does not or PMC officer 
about The court ignores what it had front of it: the 2001 Landlord 
Consent and Estoppel Certificate, Faulkner's testimony, and the parties' conduct following the 
2001 transaction. 
Thus, the evidence does not support the district court's findings and conclusions. The 
district court misapplied the law governing modification. It als failed to properly apply the law 
that requires district courts to have "substantial evidence" to support findings and conclusions in 
order for them to be upheld on appeaL Clayson 1~ Zebe, 280 P.3d 731, 735 (Idaho 2012). The 
district court, in this case, ignored the guidance of Clayson and erred when it failed to to rule that 
the Ground Lease had been modified and the rent adjustment provision changd. In essence, the 
district court exercised its powers solely to restore PMC to "rights that they have, for a 
consideration, deliberately, or even negligently, waived." Travers v. Stevens, 145 So. 851, 855 
(Fla. 1933). The district court should be reversed and the matter remanded. 
C. The district court erred by failing to find waiver. 
The evidence also established that PMC waived its right to adjust rent. PMC never 
invoked the rent adjustment provision prior to the tiling the lawsuit. IHC had never exercised 
the rent adjustment clause. PMC did not invoke the clause in the wake of it stepping in for IHC. 
The failure to act and adjust the rent constitutes a course of conduct that the district court should 
have relied upon to find waiver. 
"A clear intention to waive must be shown before waiver shall be established." Knipe 
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( v. 
from a unequivocal act 




or from to 
court must lind whether the l~lcts alleged to 
constitute waiver are true. The court must also decide whether, if true, these facts suffice as a 
matter of law to show waiver. Jd. Waiver may be evidenced by conduct, word, or acquiescence. 
Everton v. Blair, 576 P.2d 585, 587 (Idaho 1978). 
The Idaho Court of Appeals recognized that the failure to act could waive certain legal 
rights. In the criminal context, for example, the failure to request appropriate jury instructions 
would waive the associated defenses a criminal defendant may otherwise have been able to 
assert. State v. Peregrina, 2010 Ida. LEXIS 21 *7 (March 24, 2010). In yet another example, in 
appellate practice, if a party fails to support a position with argument and authority in the 
opening brief then it waives those issues. Ball v. City of Blackfoot, 273 P.3d 1266, 1271 (Idaho 
March 23,2012). In J\1aclay v. Idaho Real Estate Commission, 2012 Ida. LEXIS 35 (Idaho 
January 26, 2012), the Court declined to hear arguments that were not supported by argument or 
authority in the opening brief. !d. at *24-25 (citing Hogg 1~ Wolske, 142 Idaho 549, 559, 130 
P.3d 1087, 1097 (2006)); see also State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490,500, 198 P.3d 128, 138 (et. 
App.2008). The logic of these holdings appears to be that a party's failure to act constitutes a 
course of conduct demonstrating waiver. 
The situation is no different for parties waiving contractual rights. If a party possesses a 
particular right under a contract and fails to assert that right, then the failure to assert the right is 
a course of conduct. As noted, supra, the evidence supporting waiver is undisputed. No party 
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ever to rent I or 
transaction. PMC conducted r in a manner consistent with waiving to adjust rent 
under the Ground Quail Ridge relied on PMC's failure to act and paid down debt on the 
Quail Ridge building because it believed that the rent had been changed from an adjustable 
amount to a fixed amount (ld., 171 :20-172:4, 11-20; 174:2-7.) Quail Ridge detrimentally relied 
on PMC's conduct vis-it-vis the rent adjustment provision. Detrimental reliance may establish 
waiver. Clearwater Minerals Corp. v. Presnell, 729 P.2d 420, 425 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986). In its 
discussion of waiver, the district court never considers Quail Ridge's reliance on the failure to 
adjust the rent by PMC or its predecessor, IHC. (R VoL I, pp. 198-99.) Again, the district court 
ignored the evidence that it had before it in order to fashion a remedy and result that it desired 
rather than one supported by the evidence. 
PMC acquiesced to the rent being fixed at $9,562.50 per annum. It never sought to adjust 
the rent before the 2001 transaction and it never sought to adjust the rent in the years 
immediately following 2001. The course of conduct between the parties evidences waiver and 
the district court erred by failing to find a waiver in this case. 
D. The district court erred by not applying estoppel to bar PMC's claim. 
The district cOUli erred by not finding that PMC was estopped from claiming that it was 
owed rent other than the amount set forth in the 2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate. 
The representations made by PMC in the estoppel certificate should have been binding on PMC 
and the district court erred by allowing PMC to assert claims that contradicted the plain language 
of the estoppel certificate. 
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role estoppel is to for a 
party in order for other parties to make informed, reasonable decisions. K:'i Mach Mart, Inc. v. 
Northgate Ltd P :"'hip, 835 N.E.2d 965, 971 (IlL 2005). "A party who executes an estoppel 
certificate should not be allowed to raise claims of which it knew or should have known at the 
time the certificate was executed." K:,,' Merch Mart, Inc., 835 N.E.2d at 972. "An estoppel 
certificate binds the signatory to the statements made and estops that party from claiming to the 
contrary at a later time." Plaza Frenvay Ltd. P :'ihip v. First Mountain Bank, 81 CaL App. 4th 
616, 626, 96 Cal. Rptr.2d 865, 872 (2000). 
Here, IHC represented that the rent due under the Ground Lease Agreement was 
$9,562.50 per annum. (Det: Ex. 228, ~ 5.) Quail Ridge, Sterling, PERSI, PMI, and IHC all 
signed the document. (Id.) The representation contained in paragraph 5 does not contemplate a 
future adjustment to the rent. (Id.) The 1996 estoppel certificate contains fundamentally 
different language than the 2001 version insofar as it expressly contemplates adjusting the rent 
during the subsequent adjustment period. (Id.; see also Def. Ex. 211.) The district court erred by 
allowing PMC to seek a declaration of its rights related to adjusted rent when PMC made 
specific representations about the rent owed under the Ground Lease Agreement in the 2001 
Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate. The district court should have bound PMC to its 
representations and dismissed the claim for adjusted rent. The district court erred by failing to 
apply the law governing estoppel certificates and the district court should be reversed. 
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E. The district court erred by disregarding the Ground Lease's language. 
asserts waiver, and estoppel are dispositive 
and should result in PMC's claim being However, if the Court disagrees, Quail Ridge 
submits that the district court erred when it interpreted the Ground Lease's terms. The district 
courfs fIndings that Quail Ridge owed PMC adjusted rent for 2010-12 in the total amount of 
$445,000.00 is based on an improper reading of the Ground Lease. The district court 
misunderstood, or entirely missed, the point of the Ground Lease language and failed to correctly 
interpret the contract consistent with the evidence and the law. 
The issue tried to the district court, at its core, was one of contract interpretation. Idaho's 
case law controlling contract interpretation cases is not complex. The law provides that courts 
should begin with the document language when analyzing or interpreting a contract. Potlach 
Educ. Ass 'n v. Potlach Sch. Dist. No. 285, 148 Idaho 630, 633, 226 P.3d 1277, 1280 (2010). 
Courts should "seek to give effect to the intention of the parties." Clear Lakes Trout Co., Inc. v. 
Clear Springs Foods, Inc., 141 Idaho 117, 120, 106 P.3d 443, 446 (2005). "To determine the 
intent of the parties, the contract must be viewed as a whole and in its entirety." Id. 
When interpreting a contract, this Court begins with the document's language. In the 
absence of ambiguity, the document must be construed in its plain, ordinary and proper 
sense, according to the meaning derived from the plain wording of the instrument. 
Interpreting an unambiguous contract and determining whether there has been a violation 
of that contract is an issue of law subject to free review. A contract term is ambiguous 
when there are two different reasonable interpretations or the language is nonsensical. 
Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law, but interpreting an ambiguous term 
is an issue of fact. 
Knipe Land Co. v. Robertson, 151 Idaho 449, 454-55, 259 P.3d 595,600-01 (2011). 
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A contract IS court not 
contract. held courts roving power to rewrite contracts." 
( olMeridian v. Petra. Inc., 2013 Id. LEXIS 98, * 17 (April 1, 2013) (citing Shawver v. 
!!ucklehenJl Estates, /,LC, 140 Idaho 354, 362, 93 P.3d 685, 693 (2004)). In McCallum v. 
Camphell-Simpson Motor Co., 82 Idaho 160,349 P.2d 986 (1960), the Court wrote: 
We must construe the contract according to the plain language used by the parties. While 
a court may interpret agreements voluntarily entered into, a court cannot modify an 
agreement to as to create a new and different one, nor is the court at liberty to revise an 
agreement where its interpretation is involved. COUlis cannot make for the parties better 
agreements than they themselves have been satisfied to make, and by a process of 
interpretation relieve one of the parties from the terms which he voluntarily consented to; 
nor can courts interpret an agreement to mean something the contract does not itself 
contain. 
ld. at 166,349 P.2d at 990. The Idaho Supreme Court has consistently applied this rule. In the 
context of arbitration, the Court has held that "arbitrators are, of course, not free to disregard the 
terms of the contracts they are reviewing-their powers derive from the parties' agreement." 
Storey Cons!r. Inc. v. Hank<;, 148 Idaho 401, 409, 224 P.3d 468,476 (2009).2 
Here, the district court focused on paragraph 1.3(b) of the Ground Lease. Paragraph 
1.3(b) contained the terms related to rent adjustment. PMC initially sued Quail Ridge for breach 
of contract and argued that PMC was entitled to an increased rent based on that paragraph. (R 
VoL I, p. 1-51.) The district court dismissed the breach of contract claim after PMC rested its 
case. (ld., p. 129.) Once the breach of contract claim had been dismissed PMC only had a claim 
2 The context of arbitration is especially appropriate since the district court essentially acted as the arbitrator of the 
dispute as required by Section 13 of the Ground Lease Agreement. 
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101 
The annual net rental as set forth above shall be 
adjusted every three (3) years beginning on the Commencement Date of this Lease, 
referred to below as the rent adjustment date. 
The parties' written agreement within ninety (90) days before the applicable rent 
adjustment date shall a conclusive determination between the parties of the fair market 
value for the period to which the adjustment applies. If the parties have not so agreed by 
the applicable rent adjustment date, the determination shall be made as in the paragraph 
on Arbitration in Article 13. 
The rent adjusted shall be equal to fifteen percent (15%) percent (sic) of the fair market 
value of the leased land, exclusive of improvements on the premises. Determination of 
fair market value shall be based on the highest and best use of the land on the applicable 
rent adjustment date without taking the leasehold into account. The determination shall 
take into account the parties' agreement that the initial minimum rent is the above-stated 
percentage applied to a fair market value of Fifteen Thousand and No/I 00 Dollars 
($15,000.00) per acre and shall also take into account any detelminations of market value 
made under this lease for the purpose of adjustments for periods preceding the applicable 
rent adjustment date. 
If the determination of adjusted rent is made after the applicable rent adjustment date, 
lessee shall continue to pay rent at the rate applicable to the preceding period until the 
adjusted rent is determined. The party indebted shall, promptly after the determination, 
pay any difference for the period affected by the adjustment. 
(PI. Ex. 10L) The Court found that the some of this language ambiguous. (R VoL I, pp. 62-63; 
Hr'g T1'. 4:1-13:18, March 26,2012.) Specifically, the Court found the following portion of 
Section 1.3(b) ambiguous: 
The determination shall take into account the parties' agreement that the initial minimum 
rent is the above-stated percentage applied to a fair market value of Fifteen Thousand and 
No/I 00 Dollars ($15,000.00) per acre and shall also take into account any determinations 
of market value made under this lease for the purpose of adjustments for periods 
preceding the applicable rent adjustment date. 
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8: 1 
not mean that it is not to contract or court should 
just ignore the when interpreting the contract document. 
The district court concluded that it should disregard or ignore certain language in the 
Ground Lease Agreement. That decision was wrong. Specitically, the district court wrote: 
(26) The Court will give no weight to the language contained in the Lease Agreement 
that when adjusting the rent 'the determination shall take into account the parties' 
agreement that the initial minimum rent is above-the stated percentage applied to a fair 
market value of Fifteen Thousand and Nolt 00 Dollars ($15,000.00) per acre.' The 
reason the Court will give no weight to this language is that there has been no credible 
evidence which this Comt accepts concerning whether this $15,000.00 per acre figure 
was the result of a market analysis conducted by the parties in 1983, or whether it was a 
figure higher or lower than market value as discussed in the Court's Conclusion of Law 
number 21. 
(27) Likewise, the Court concludes that there is no course of dealings between the parties 
to assist the Court in determining what construction the parties placed upon this provision 
of the Lease Agreement by observing and construing their conduct or dealings. The crux 
of the matter is that there was no course of dealing for the following reasons (1) Sterling, 
and later Quail Ridge, had no incentive to seek a rent adjustment (in a manner of 
speaking if Sterling or Quail Ridge 'rocked the boat' they had nothing to gain and only 
increased rent to lose if they initiated a rent adjustment under the Lease Agreement); (2) 
IHC and Bannock County, through poor management and/or having forgotten about the 
rent adjustment provision, never sought a rent adjustment. [footnote omitted] 
(28) Therefore: (l) because there is no evidence to establish how the original fifteen 
thousand dollar per acre figure was reached; and (2) because there is no evidence to 
establish a course of dealing to establish what construction the parties intended to give to 
the language related to subsequent adjustments, the Court will disregard these provisions 
of the [Ground Lease]. 
(R Vol. I, p. 195.) The act of ignoring, giving no weight to contract terms, or disregarding the 
contract language, necessarily creates a new contract with new terms. The creation of a new 
contract is not the goal of contract interpretation. See Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, LLC, 140 
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p court "'''JU',," contract 
anew ld. 
district court reasoned that since no parole evidence was admitted during trial about 
the terms it found ambiguous that it could not interpret the contract as written. That rationale is 
inherently Ilawed and entirely misses the point. The issue in the case was not "how" the parties 
initially reached the $15,000.00 figure. The process for deciding the original value given to the 
real property does not matter when adjusting the rent. The tact that IHC and Sterling originally 
agreed on the $15,000.00/acre value is relevant; how they reached that figure ultimately does not 
matter. The Ground Lease clearly contemplated subsequent adjustments in rent "taking into 
account" the original, agreed upon figure. The $15,000.00/acre figure, by the document's own 
terms, has to be lactored into subsequent adjustments of the rent in some manner. (PI. Ex. 101.) 
The district court did not take those tacts into account and therefore misapplied the law to the 
document. The district court's improper application of law and fact resulted in its incorrect 
findings because contract intent is to be derived based on the contract language as a whole. JR. 
Simp/ot v. Bosen, 144 Idaho 611, 614, 167 P.3d 748, 751 (2006); Gem-Valley Ranches v. Small, 
90 Idaho 354, 372, 411 P.2d 943, 954 (1966). 
The existence or absence of extrinsic evidence does not justify willfully disregarding 
contract language. Instead, the district court should have factored in the "taking into account" 
language rather than just ignoring it or giving it no weight. The district court rewrote the parties' 
agreement when it should not have done so. Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, LLC, 140 Idaho 
354,362,93 P.3d 685, 693 (2004). 
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account $1 were 
to rent a vastly adjustment to rent than the 
one created ex nihi/o by the district court. Any adjustment to rent based on the actual language 
of 1.3(b) would be based on the incremental change in land values for the adjustment periods at 
issue in this case. Applying the incremental change, regardless of whether it is an increase or 
decrease in land value, takes into account the prior agreements as to value and rent. 
The district court only awarded adjusted rent for 2010. The two experts in the case both 
testified that land values decreased from 2007 to 2010. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, 62:11-65:2; Vol. II, 
202:2-7.) lanoush testified that the decrease inland values from 2007 to 2010 was -8.33%. (ld. 
VoL I, 64:11-18.) The adjustment ofrent, if the any, should have factored in the incremental, 
relative change in land values of -8.33% as applied to the $15,000.00/acre value. This would 
have reduced the rent owed by Quail Ridge to PMC. 
The justification for this interpretation is firmly based in the Ground Lease's language. 
The Ground Lease mandates that the prior value be taken into consideration. (PI. Ex. 101.) The 
Ground Lease does not, significantly, require an objective market value for the property. (ld.) 
Such an "objective" market value for the real property fails to take into account the Ground 
Lease's language. For over thirty years, the parties and their predecessors stipulated, acquiesced, 
or otherwise agreed that the land value for prior adjustment periods was $15,000.00lacre. The 
parties did this through various economic upswings and downturns. That course of conduct 
should have been taken into account by the district court when adjusting the rent. It chose not to 
do so but by making that choice it reached a result not even remotely based on the actual 
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contract. a court 
remanded for a nrn ... "" 
F. The district court erred by not finding a course of dealing. 
The district court expressly found the absence of a course of conduct that would have 
been relevant to the determination of any adjusted rent. However, the district court's conclusion 
could only be reached by (a) ignoring or minimizing certain pieces of evidence and (b) by 
ignoring certain terms in the Ground Lease. 
Parties' course of dealing is relevant to determining intent when interpreting contract 
terms. JR. Simp/of v. Bosen, 144 Idaho 611, 614, 167 P.3d 748, 751 (2006). The district court 
had before it evidence in the form of deposition testimony establishing IHe's mentality about 
how the terms of 1.3(b) were to be carried out. From 1989 to 2000, there was a conscious 
decision by IHC to not adjust the rent. (R VoL II, pp. 309-10, Christison Dep. 10:1-11:3; 12:24-
13:4.) The conscious decision to leave the rent at $9,562.50 was a course of conduct by IHC that 
should have bound PMC. At the very least IHe's conscious, deliberate choice to leave the rent 
where it was at in 1983 should have been "taken into account" when deciding any rent 
adjustments. The district court did not factor in IHC and Sterling's course of dealings and 
instead elected to ignore it because PMC, when it stepped into IHe's shoes, failed to adjust rent 
or otherwise pay attention to the Ground Lease. However, just because PMC negligently 
managed its contracts does not mean that the prior, voluntary choices by IHC to not adjust rent 
fails to be relevant when adjusting rent under the Ground Lease. Paragraph 1.3(b) requires that 
the prior adjustments of rent be "taken into account" and the district court admittedly did not take 
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account 11 Vol. I, 1 
to take into account the past actions by and PMC was an error by the 
district court. Its that there was no course of dealing in this case is not supported by 
substantial evidence; indeed, there is no evidence supporting the district court's conclusions. 
G. The district court erred by admitting Brad Janoush's testimony. 
1. Standard (?lReview 
District court decisions related to the admission of expert testimony are reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion. Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561, 97 P.3d 428, 431 (2004). "In reviewing 
whether or not a district court abused its discretion this Court determines: (l) whether the trial 
court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial comi acted within 
the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the 
specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise 
of reason." Kirk v. Ford Motor Co., 116 P.3d 27,30-31 (Idaho 2005). 
2. Argument 
The district court relied on the testimony ofPMC's expert witness, Brad lanoush 
(Janoush) for reaching its conclusion about the amount of rent owed by Quail Ridge to PMC for 
the 2010 rent adjustment period. Quail Ridge moved to strike lanoush's testimony from the 
record and the district court denied that motion. (R VoL I, p. 129.) The district court abused its 
discretion because it did not act within the outer boundaries of its discretion and within the 
applicable legal standard. The district court also failed to reach its decision by an exercise of 
reason. 
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of IS to court. 
v. E. Idaho 1 lealth ,1 P.3d 11 1183 (Idaho 11). The test for admissibility is 
Rule 702 ofthe Idaho Rules of Evidence. lei. Idaho Rule of Evidence 702 states: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert 
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of 
an opinion or otherwise. 
[DAIIO R. EVID. 702 (2012). Rule 703 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence is as follows: 
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or 
inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the 
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular tield in furming 
opinions or inference upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in 
evidence in order fur the opinion or inference to be admitted. Facts or data that are 
otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion 
or inference unless the court determines that their probative value in assisting the jury to 
evaluate the expert's opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial efTect. 
IDAHO R. EVlD. 703. "Expert opinion which is speculative, conclusory, or unsubstantiated by the 
facts in the record is of no assistance to the jury in rendering its verdict and, therefure, is 
inadmissible as evidence." Weeks, 153 P .3d at 1184. When analyzing the admissibility of an 
expert's proposed testimony, the fucus of the court's inquiry must be on the "principles and 
methodology" used and not the conclusions generated. Id. 
Here, the district court admitted lanoush's testimony despite lanoush's suspect 
methodology and his failure to consider the terms of the Ground Lease. Quail Ridge objected to 
lanoush's opinions as to value during trial. (Trial T1'. Vol. I, 52:18-22; 60:12-20; 61:7-16.) 
lanoush testified that he had never reviewed the terms of the Ground Lease prior to performing 
his appraisal. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, 63:10-15.) The Ground Lease sets f01ih how the parties should 
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· ( 101.) It to 
$1 determinations of value. By 
acknowledging he did not review the Ground Lease or its Janoush could not have "taken 
into account" either of those nlctors when coming up with his values that would be relevant to 
the adjustments of rent. Janoush did not employ a proper methodology to the case. His opinion 
that the land values were $990,000 for the 4.25 acre parcel was not tied to the Ground Lease at 
all. Janoush's opinions lacked foundation and were not relevant. 
Admission of Janoush's opinions clearly impacted the outcome in this matter. The 
district court relied on Janoush's opinions deciding the adjusted rent (R Vol. I, pp. 191-
92.) However, Janoush applied a t1awed methodology and lacked the requisite foundation to 
testify about how the rent should be adjusted in this case. 
In reliance on Janoush's testimony, the district court incorrectly calculated the adjusted 
rent based on the current land values. The district court ignored the Ground Lease requirements 
to take into account (a) prior agreements regarding adjustments and (b) the initial value being set 
at $15,000.00!acre. The district court's ignored the contractual language and should be reversed. 
IV. CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUESTED 
As a result of the foregoing, the district court should be reversed and remanded. 
Mich el . Gaftney 
John ~vondet 
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Attorneys for the Defendant! Appellant 
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